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ABSTRACT
There is currently much debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid and about what kind of projects
can engender economic development. There is skepticism about the ability of econometric analysis
to resolve these issues, or of development agencies to learn from their own experience. In response,
there is movement in development economics towards the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
to accumulate credible knowledge of what works, without over-reliance on questionable theory or
statistical methods. When RCTs are not possible, this movement advocates quasi-randomization through
instrumental variable (IV) techniques or natural experiments. I argue that many of these applications
are unlikely to recover quantities that are useful for policy or understanding: two key issues are the
misunderstanding of exogeneity, and the handling of heterogeneity. I illustrate from the literature on
aid and growth. Actual randomization faces similar problems as quasi-randomization, notwithstanding
rhetoric to the contrary. I argue that experiments have no special ability to produce more credible knowledge
than other methods, and that actual experiments are frequently subject to practical problems that undermine
any claims to statistical or epistemic superiority. I illustrate using prominent experiments in development.
As with IV methods, RCT-based evaluation of projects is unlikely to lead to scientific progress in
the understanding of economic development. I welcome recent trends in development experimentation










The effectiveness of development assistance is a topic of great public interest. Much of 
the public debate among non-economists takes it for granted that, if the funds were made 
available, development would follow, Pogge (2005), Singer (2004), and at least some 
economists agree, Sachs (2005, 2008). Others, most notably Easterly (2006), are deeply 
skeptical, a position that has been forcefully argued at least since Bauer (1971, 1981). 
Few academic economists or political scientists agree with Sachs’ views, but there is a 
wide range of intermediate positions, recently well assembled by Easterly (2008). The 
debate runs the gamut from the macro—can foreign assistance raise growth rates and 
eliminate poverty?—to the micro—what sorts of projects are likely to be effective?—
should aid focus on electricity and roads, or on the provision of schools and clinics or 
vaccination campaigns? In this lecture, I shall be concerned with both the macro and 
micro kinds of assistance. I shall have very little to say about what actually works and 
what does not; but it is clear from the literature that we do not know. Instead, my main 
concern is with how we should go about finding out whether and how assistance works 
and with methods for gathering evidence and learning from it in a scientific and 
cumulative way.  I am not an econometrician, but I believe that econometric 
methodology needs to be assessed, not only by methodologists, but by those who are 
concerned with the substance of the issue. Only they (we) are in a position to tell when 
something has gone wrong with the application of econometric methods, not because 
they are incorrect given their assumptions, but because their assumptions do not apply, or 
because they are incorrectly conceived for the problem at hand. Or at least that is my 
excuse for meddling in these matters.   2
  Any analysis of the extent to which foreign aid has increased economic growth in 
recipient countries immediately confronts the familiar problem of simultaneous causality; 
the effect of aid on growth, if any, will be disguised by effects running in the opposite 
direction, from poor economic performance to compensatory or humanitarian aid. It is 
not immediately obvious how to disentangle these effects, and some have argued that the 
question is not answerable and that econometric studies of it should be abandoned. 
Certainly, the econometric studies that use international evidence to examine aid 
effectiveness currently have low professional status. Yet it cannot be right to give up on 
the issue. There is no general or public understanding that nothing can be said, and to 
give up the econometric analysis is simply to abandon precise statements for loose and 
unconstrained histories of episodes selected to support the position of the speaker. 
  The analysis of aid effectiveness typically uses cross-country growth regressions with 
the simultaneity between aid and growth dealt with using instrumental variable methods. 
I shall argue in the next section that there has been a good deal of misunderstanding in 
the literature about the use of instrumental variables. Econometric analysis has changed 
its focus over the years, away from the analysis of models derived from theory towards 
much looser specifications that are statistical representations of program evaluation. With 
this shift, instrumental variables have moved from being solutions to a well-defined 
problem of inference to being devices that induce quasi-randomization. Old and new 
understandings of instruments co-exist, leading to errors, misunderstandings and 
confusion, as well as unfortunate and unnecessary rhetorical barriers between disciplines 
working on the same problems. These abuses of technique have contributed to a general 
skepticism about the ability of econometric analysis to answer these big questions.   3
  A similar state of affairs exists in the microeconomic area, in the analysis of the 
effectiveness of individual programs and projects, such as the construction of 
infrastructure—dams, roads, water supply, electricity—and in the delivery of services—
for example for education, health or policing. There is great frustration with aid 
organizations, particularly the World Bank, for allegedly failing to learn from its projects 
and to build up a systematic catalog of what works and what does not. In addition, some 
of the skepticism about macro econometrics extends to micro econometrics, so that there 
has been a movement away from such methods and towards randomized controlled trials. 
According to Esther Duflo, one of the leaders of the new movement in development, 
“Creating a culture in which rigorous randomized evaluations are promoted, encouraged, 
and financed has the potential to revolutionize social policy during the 21
st century, just 
as randomized trials revolutionized medicine during the 20
th.” This quote is from a 2004 
Lancet editorial headed “The World Bank is finally embracing science.”  
  In Section 4 of this paper, I shall argue that in ideal circumstances, randomized 
evaluations of projects are useful for obtaining a convincing estimate of the average 
effect of a program or project. The price for this success is a focus that is too narrow to 
tell us “what works” in development, to design policy, or to advance scientific knowledge 
about development processes. Project evaluation using randomized controlled trials is 
unlikely to discover the elusive keys to development, nor to be the basis for a cumulative 
research program that might progressively lead to a better understanding of development. 
This argument applies a fortiori to instrumental variables strategies that are aimed at 
generating quasi-experiments; the value of econometric methods cannot be assessed by 
how closely they approximate randomized controlled trials. Following Cartwright   4
(2007a, b), I argue that evidence from randomized controlled trials has no special 
priority. Randomization is not a gold standard because “there is no gold standard,” 
Cartwright (2007a.) Randomized controlled trials cannot automatically trump other 
evidence, they do not occupy any special place in some hierarchy of evidence, nor does it 
make sense to refer to them as “hard” while other methods are “soft”. These rhetorical 
devices are just that; a metaphor is not an argument. 
  More positively, I shall argue that the analysis of projects needs to be refocused 
towards the investigation of potentially generalizable mechanisms that explain why and 
in what contexts projects can be expected to work. The best of the experimental work in 
development economics already does so, because its practitioners are too talented to be 
bound by their own methodological prescriptions. Yet there would be much to be said for 
doing so more openly. I concur with the general message in Pawson and Tilley (1997), 
who argue that thirty years of project evaluation in sociology, education and criminology 
was largely unsuccessful because it focused on whether projects work instead of on why 
they work.  In economics, warnings along the same lines have been repeatedly given by 
James Heckman, see particularly Heckman (1992) and Heckman and Smith (1995), and 
much of what I have to say is a recapitulation of his arguments. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out some econometric preliminaries 
concerning instrumental variables and the vexed question of exogeneity. Section 3 is 
about aid and growth. Section 4 is about randomized controlled trials. Section 5 is about 
using empirical evidence and where we should go next. 
 
   5
2. Instruments, identification, and the meaning of exogeneity 
It is useful to begin with a simple and familiar econometric model that I can use to 
illustrate the differences between different flavors of econometric practice; this has 
nothing to do with economic development, but has the virtue of simplicity and is easy to 
contrast with the development practice that I wish to discuss. In contrast to the models 
that I will discuss later, I think of this as a model in the spirit of the Cowles Foundation. 
It is the simplest possible Keynesian macroeconomic model of national income 
determination taken from once-standard econometrics textbooks. There are two equations 
which together comprise a complete macroeconomic system. The first equation is a 
consumption function, in which aggregate consumption is a linear function of aggregate 
national income, while the second is the national income accounting identity that says 
that income is the sum of consumption and investment. I write the system in standard 
notation as 
  CY u α β = ++  (1) 
  YCI ≡ +  (2) 
According to (1), consumers choose the level of aggregate consumption with reference to 
their income, while in (2), investment is set by the “animal spirits” of entrepreneurs in a 
way that is outside of the model. No modern macroeconomist would take this model 
seriously, though the simple consumption function is clearly an ancestor of more 
satisfactory and complete modern formulations; in particular, we can think of it (or at 
least its descendents) as being derived from a coherent model of intertemporal choice. 
Similarly, modern versions would postulate some theory for what determines investment   6
I; here it is simply taken as given, and assumed to be orthogonal to the consumption 
disturbance u. 
  In this model, consumption and income are simultaneously determined so that, in 
particular, a stochastic realization of u—consumers displaying animal spirits of their 
own—will affect not only C, but also Y through equation (2), so that there is a positive 
correlation between C and Y.  As a result, ordinary least squares estimation of (1) will 
lead to upwardly biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameter . β   
  This simultaneity problem can be dealt with in a number of ways. One is to solve (1) 



















Either of these equations can be consistently estimated by OLS, and it is easy to show 
that the same estimates of α  and β  will be obtained from either one. An alternative 
method of estimation is to focus on the consumption function (1), and to use our 
knowledge of (2) to note that investment can be used as an instrumental variable (IV) for 
income. In the IV regression, there is a “first stage” regression in which income is 
regressed on investment; this is identical to equation (4), which is part of the reduced 
form. In the second stage, consumption is regressed on the predicted value of income 
from (4). In this simple case, the IV estimate of β  is identical to the estimate from the 
reduced form. This simple model may not be a very good model, but it is a model, if only 
a primitive one.   7
  I now leap forward sixty years, and consider an apparently similar set up, again using 
an absurdly simple specification. The World Bank (let us imagine) is interested in 
whether to advise the government of China to build more railway stations. The Bank 
economists write down an econometric model in which the poverty head count ratio in 
city c is taken to be a linear function of an indicator R of whether or not the city has a 
railway station, 
  cc c PR v γ θ = ++  (5) 
where θ  (I hesitate to call it a parameter) indicates the effect—presumably negative—of 
infrastructure (here a railway station) on poverty. While we cannot expect to get useful 
estimates of θ  from OLS estimation of (5)—railway stations may be built to serve more 
prosperous cities, they are rarely built in deserts where there are no people, or there may 
be “third factors” that influence both—this is seen as a “technical problem” for which 
there is a wide range of econometric treatments including, of course, instrumental 
variables.  
  We no longer have the reduced form of the previous model to guide us but if we can 
find an instrument Z that is correlated with whether a town has a railway station, but 
uncorrelated with v, we can do the same calculations and obtain a consistent estimate. For 
the record, I write this equation 
  cc c RZ φ ϕη = ++  (6) 
Good candidates for Z might be indicators of whether the city has been designated by the 
Government of China as belonging to a special “infrastructure development area,” or 
perhaps an earthquake that conveniently destroyed a selection of railway stations, or even   8
the existence of river confluence near the city, since rivers were an early source of power, 
and railways served the power-based industries. I am making fun, but not much. 
  My main argument is that the two econometric structures, in spite of their 
resemblance and the fact that IV techniques can be used for both, are in fact quite 
different. In particular, the IV procedures that work for the effect of national income on 
consumption are unlikely to give useful results for the effect of railway stations on 
poverty. To explain the differences, I begin with the language. In the original example, 
consumption and income are treated symmetrically, and appear as such in the reduced 
form equations (3) and (4). In contemporary examples, such as the railways, there is no 
symmetry. Instead, we have a “main” equation (5), which used to be the “structural” 
equation (1). We also have a “first-stage” equation, which is the regression of railway 
stations on the instrument, which was previously just one of the equations in the reduced 
form. The reduced form, of course, was typically more completely specified than the 
first-stage regression, since it was derived from a notionally complete model of the 
system. The now rarely considered regression of the variable of interest on the 
instrument, here of poverty on earthquakes or on river confluences, is nowadays referred 
to as the reduced form, although it was originally one equation of a multiple equation 
reduced form within which it had no special significance. These language shifts 
sometimes cause confusion, but they are not the most important differences between the 
two systems. 
  The crucial difference is that the relationship between railways and poverty is not a 
model at all, unlike the consumption model which embodied a(n admittedly crude) theory 
of income determination. While it is clearly possible that the construction of a railway   9
station will reduce poverty, there are many possible mechanisms, some of which will 
work in one context and not in another. In consequence θ  is unlikely to be constant over 
different cities, nor can its variation be usefully thought of as random variation that is 
uncorrelated with anything else of interest. Instead, it is precisely the variation in θ  that 
encapsulates the poverty reduction mechanisms that ought to be the main objects of our 
enquiry. Instead, the equation of interest is thought of as a representation of something 
more akin to an experiment or a biomedical trial, in which some cities get “treated” with 
a station, and some do not. The role of econometric analysis is not, as in the Cowles 
example, to estimate and investigate a casual model, but “to create an analogy, perhaps 
forced, between an observational study and an experiment,” Freedman (2006, 691). 
  One immediate task is to recognize and somehow deal with the variation inθ , which 
is typically referred to as the “heterogeneity problem” in the literature. The obvious way 
is to define a parameter of interest in a way that corresponds to something we want to 
know for policy evaluation—perhaps the average effect on poverty over some group of 
cities—and then devise an appropriate estimation strategy. However, this step is often 
skipped in practice, perhaps because of a mistaken belief that (5) is a structural equation 
in which θ  is a constant, so that the analysis can go immediately to the choice of 
instrument Z, over which a great deal of imagination is often exercised. As in the 
traditional model, the instrument is selected to satisfy two criteria, that it be correlated 
with  c R  and uncorrelated with  . c v  Of course, if heterogeneity is indeed present, the 
probability limit of the IV estimator will in general depend on the choice of instrument, 
Heckman (1997). Such a procedure is the opposite of standard statistical practice, in 
which a parameter of interest is defined first, followed by an estimator that delivers that   10
parameter. Instead, we have a procedure in which the choice of the instrument, which is 
guided by criteria designed for a different situation, is implicitly allowed to determine the 
parameter of interest. This goes beyond the old story of looking an object where the light 
is strong enough to see; rather, we have control over the light, but choose to let it fall 
where it may, and then proclaim that whatever it illuminates is what we were looking for 
all along. 
  Recent econometric analysis has given us a more precise characterization of what we 
can expect from such a method. In the railway example, where the instrument is the 
designation of a city as belonging to the “special infrastructure zone,” the probability 
limit of the IV estimator is the average of poverty reduction effects over those cities who 
were induced to construct a railway station by being so designated. This averages is 
known as the “local average treatment effect” (LATE), and its recovery by IV estimation 
requires a number of non-trivial conditions including, for example, that no cities who 
would have constructed a railway station are perverse enough to be actually deterred 
from doing so by the positive designation, see Angrist and Imbens (1994), who 
established the LATE theorem. The LATE may, or may not, be a parameter of interest to 
the World Bank or the Chinese government and in general, there is no reason to suppose 
that it will be. For example, the parameter estimated will typically not be the average 
poverty reduction effect over the designated cities, nor the average effect over all cities. 
  I find it hard to make any sense of the LATE. We are unlikely to learn much about 
the processes at work if we refuse to say anything about what determinesθ ; 
heterogeneity is not a technical problem calling for an econometric solution, but is a 
reflection of the fact that we have not started on our proper business, which is trying to   11
understand what is going on. Of course, if we are as skeptical of the ability of economic 
theory to deliver useful models as are many applied economists today, the ability to avoid 
modeling can be seen as an advantage, though it should not be a surprise when such an 
approach provides answers that are hard to interpret. 
  There is a related issue that bedevils a good deal of contemporary applied work, 
which is the understanding of exogeneity, a word that I have so far avoided. Suppose, for 
the moment, that the effect of railway stations on poverty is the same in all cities, and we 
are looking for an instrument, which is required to be exogenous in order to consistently 
estimateθ . According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, “exogenous” means “caused by 
factors or an agent from outside the organism or system,” and this common usage is often 
employed in applied work. However, the consistency of IV estimation requires that the 
instrument be orthogonal to the error term v in the equation of interest, which is not 
implied by the Merriam-Webster definition, see Leamer (1985, p. 260). Heckman (2000) 
suggests using the term “external” (which he traces back to Wright and Frisch in the 
1930s) for the Merriam-Webster definition, for variables whose values are not set or 
caused by the variables in the model (according to this, consumption and investment are 
“internal” variables, and investment an “external” variable), and keeping “exogenous” for 
the orthogonality condition that is required for consistent estimation in this instrumental 
variable context. The terms are hardly standard, but I adopt them here because I need to 
make the distinction. The main issue, however, is not the terminology, but that the two 
concepts be kept distinct, so that we can see when the argument being offered is a 
justification for externality when what is required is exogeneity. An instrument that is   12
external, but not exogeneous, will not yield consistent estimates of the parameter of 
interest, even when that parameter is constant. 
  Failure to separate externality and endogeneity has caused, and continues to cause, 
endless confusion in the applied development (and other) literatures. Natural or 
geographic variables—distance from the equator (as an instrument for per capita GDP in 
explaining religiosity, McCleary and Barro, 2006), rivers (as an instrument for the 
number of school districts in explaining educational outcomes, Hoxby, 2000), land 
gradient (as an instrument for dam construction in explaining poverty, Duflo and Pande, 
2007), month of birth as an instrument for years of schooling in an earnings regression, 
Angrist and Krueger, 1991, or rainfall as an instrument for economic growth in 
explaining civil war, Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004, and the examples could be 
multiplied ad infinitum)—are not affected by the variables being explained, and are 
clearly external. So are historical variables—the mortality of colonial settlers is not 
influenced by current institutional arrangements in ex-colonial countries, Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson (2001), nor does the country’s growth rate today influence which 
country they were colonized by, Barro 1998. Whether any of these instruments is 
exogenous depends on the nature of the equation of interest, and is not guaranteed by its 
externality. And because exogeneity is an identifying assumption that must be made prior 
to analysis of the data, no empirical tests are possible. This does not prevent many 
attempts in the literature, often by misinterpreting a satisfactory overidentification test as 
evidence for valid identification. Such tests can tell us whether estimates change when we 
select different subsets from a set of possible instruments. While the test is clearly   13
informative, acceptance is consistent with all of the instruments being invalid, while 
failure is consistent with a subset being correct.  
  In my running example, earthquakes and rivers are external to the system, and are not 
caused by poverty nor by the construction of railway stations, and the designation as an 
infrastructure zone may also be determined by factors independent of poverty or 
railways. But even earthquakes (or rivers) are not exogenous if they have an effect on 
poverty other than through their destruction (or encouragement) of railway stations, as 
will almost always be the case. The absence of simultaneity does not guarantee 
exogeneity; exogeneity requires the absence of simultaneity, but is not implied by it. 
Even random numbers—the ultimate external variables—may be endogenous, at least in 
the presence of heterogeneity. Again, the example comes from Heckman’s (1997) 
discussion of Angrist’s (1990) famous use of draft lottery numbers as an instrumental 
variable in his analysis of the subsequent earnings of Vietnam veterans.  
  I can illustrate Heckman’s argument using the Chinese railways example with the 
zone designation as instrument. Rewrite the equation of interest, (5), as 
  {( ) } cc cc c c PR wR v R γθ γθ θθ =+ + =+ + + −  (7) 
where  c w  is defined by the term in curly brackets, and θ  is the mean of θ  over the cities 
that get the station so that the compound error term w has mean zero. Suppose the 
designation as an infrastructure zone is c D , which takes values 1 or 0, and that the 
Chinese bureaucracy, persuaded by young development economists, decides to 
randomize and sets the designation of cities by flipping a Yuan. For consistent estimation 
of  , θ  we want the covariance of the instrument with the error to be zero. The covariance 
is   14
  () [ () ] [ () | 1 , 1 ] ( 1 , 1 ) cc EDw E R D E D R PD R θθ θθ = − = − == ==  (8) 
which will be zero if either (a) the average effect of building a railway station on poverty 
among the cities induced to build one by the designation is the same as the average effect 
among those who would have built one anyway, or (b) no city not designated builds a 
railway station
1. If (b) is not guaranteed by fiat, we cannot suppose that it will otherwise 
hold, and we might reasonably hope that among the cities who build railway stations, 
those induced to do so by the designation are those where there is the largest effect on 
poverty, which violates (a). In the example of the Vietnam veterans, the instrument (the 
draft lottery number) fails to be exogenous because the error term in the earnings 
equation depends on each individual’s rate of return to schooling, and whether or not 
each potential draftee accepted their assignment—their veteran’s status—depends on that 
rate of return. In practice, most instruments are not random numbers, and the assumption 
that the instrument is orthogonal to  c ν , which is accepted in (8), will also have to be 
defended. 
  The general lesson here is once again the ultimate futility of trying to avoid thinking 
about how and why things work; if we do not do so, we are left with undifferentiated 
heterogeneity that is likely to prevent consistent estimation of any parameter of interest. 
One appropriate response is to specify exactly how cities respond to their designation, an 
approach that leads to Heckman’s local instrumental variable methods, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (1999, 2007), Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006). Similar questions are 
pursued in van den Berg (2008). 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Winston Lin for clarification on this point.   15
3. Instruments of development 
The question of whether aid has helped economies grow faster is typically asked within 
the framework of standard growth regressions. These regressions use data for many 
countries over a period of years, usually from the Penn World Table, the current version 
of which provides data on real per capita GDP and its components in purchasing power 
dollars for more than 150 countries as far back as 1950. The model to be estimated has 
the rate of growth of per capita GDP as the dependent variable, while the explanatory 
variables include the lagged value of GDP per capita, the share of investment in GDP, 
and measures of the educational level of the population, see for example Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995, Chapter 12) for an overview. Other variables are often added, and my 
main concern here is with one of these, external assistance (aid) as a fraction of GDP. A 
typical specification can be written 
  10 1 2 3 4 ln ln
ct
ct ct ct ct ct ct
ct
I
YY H Z A u
Y
ββ β β β θ + Δ= + + + + + +  (9) 
where Y is per capita GDP, I is investment, H is a measure of human capital or education, 
and A is the variable of interest, aid as a share of GDP. Z stands for whatever other 
variables are included. The index c is for country and t for time. Growth is rarely 
measured on a year to year basis—the data in the Penn World Table are not suitable for 
annual analysis—so that growth may be measured over ten, twenty, or forty year 
intervals. With around forty years of data, there are four, two, or one observation for each 
country. 
  An immediate question is whether the growth equation (9) is a model-based Cowles-
type equation, as in my national income example, or whether it is more akin to the 
atheoretical analyses in my invented Chinese railway example. There are elements of   16
both here. If we ignore the Z and A variables in (9), the model can be thought of as a 
Solow growth model, extended to add human capital to physical capital, see again Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, who derive their empirical specifications from the theory, and also 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), who extended the Solow model to include education. 
However, the addition of the other variables, including aid, is typically less well justified. 
In some cases, for example under the assumption that all aid is invested, it is possible to 
calculate what effect we might expect aid to have, see Rajan and Subramanian (2005). If 
we follow this route, (9) would not be useful—because aid is already included—and we 
should instead investigate whether aid is indeed invested, and then infer the effectiveness 
of aid from the effectiveness of investment. Even so, it presumably matters what kind of 
investment is promoted by aid, and aid for roads, for dams, for vaccination programs, or 
for humanitarian purposes after an earthquake are likely to have different effects on 
subsequent growth. More broadly, one of the main issues of contention in the whole 
debate is what aid actually does. Just to list a few of the possibilities, does aid increase 
investment, does aid crowd out domestic investment, is aid stolen, or does aid create rent-
seeking that undercuts the long-run conditions for growth? Once all of these possibilities 
are admitted, it is clear that the analysis of (9) is not a Cowles model at all, but is seen as 
some sort of biomedical experiment in which different countries are “dosed” with 
different amounts of aid, and we are trying to measure the average response. As in the 
Chinese railways case, a regression such as (9) will not give us what we want, because 
the doses of aid are not randomly administered to different countries, so our first task is 
to find an instrumental variable that will generate quasi-randomness.   17
  The most obvious problem with a regression of aid on growth is the simultaneous 
feedback from growth to aid that is generated by humanitarian responses to economic 
collapse or to natural or man-made disasters that engender economic collapse. More 
generally, aid flows from rich countries to poor countries, and poor countries, by 
definition, are those with poor records of economic growth. This feedback, from low 
growth to high aid, will obscure, nullify, or reverse any positive effects of aid. Most of 
the literature attempts to eliminate this feedback by using one or more instrumental 
variables and, although they would not express it in these terms, the aim of the 
instrumentation is to a restore a situation in which the pure effect of aid on growth can be 
observed, as if in a randomized situation. How close we get to this ideal depends, of 
course, on the choice of instrument.  
  Although there is some variation across studies, there is a standard set of instruments, 
originally proposed by Boone (1996), which include the log of population size and 
various country dummies, for example, a dummy for Egypt, or for francophone West 
Africa. One or both of these instruments are used in almost all the papers in a large 
subsequent literature, including Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 
2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guillamont and Chauvet (2001), Lensink and White 
(2001), Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2003), Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004), 
Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004), Rajan and Subramanian (2005), and Roodman 
(2008). The rationale for population size is that larger countries get less aid per capita, 
because the aid agencies allocate aid on a country basis, with less than full allowance for 
population size. The rationale for what I shall refer to as the “Egypt instrument” is that 
Egypt gets a great deal of American aid as part of the Camp David accords in which it   18
agreed to a partial rapprochement with Israel. The same argument applied to the 
francophone countries, which receive additional aid from France because of their past 
colonial status. By comparing these countries with countries not so favored, or by 
comparing populous with less populous countries, we can observe a kind of variation in 
the share of aid in GDP that is unaffected by the negative feedback from poor growth to 
compensatory aid. In effect, we are using the variation across populations of different 
sizes as a natural experiment to reveal the effects of aid. 
  If we examine the effects of aid on growth without any allowance for reverse 
causality, for example by estimating equation (9) by ordinary least squares, the estimated 
effect is typically negative. For example, Rajan and Subramanian (2005), in one of the 
most careful recent studies, find that an increase in aid by one percent of GDP comes 
with a reduction in the growth rate of one tenth of a percentage point a year. Easterly 
(2005) paints with a broader brush, and provides many other (sometimes spectacular) 
examples of negative associations between aid and growth. When instrumental variables 
are used to eliminate the reverse causality, Rajan and Subramanian find a weak or zero 
effect of aid, and contrast that finding with the robust positive effects of investment on 
growth in specifications like (9). I should note although Rajan and Subramanian’s study 
is an excellent one, it is certainly not without its critics, and as the authors note, there are 
many difficult econometric problems beyond the choice of instruments, including how to 
estimate dynamic models with country fixed effects on limited data, the choice of 
countries and sample period, the type of aid that needs to be considered, and so on. 
Indeed, it is those other issues that are the focus of most of the literature cited above. The 
substance of this debate is far from over.    19
  My main concern here is with the use of the instruments, what they tell us, and what 
they might tell us. The first point is that neither the “Egypt” nor the population instrument 
are plausibly exogenous; both are external—Camp David is not part of the model, nor 
was it caused by Egypt’s economic growth, and similarly for population size—but 
exogeneity would require that neither “Egypt” nor population size have any influence on 
economic growth except through the effects on aid flows, which makes no sense at all. 
We also need to recognize the heterogeneity in the aid responses, and try to think about 
how the different instruments are implicitly choosing different averages, involving 
different weightings of countries. Or we could stop right here, conclude that there are no 
valid instruments, and that the aid to growth question is not answerable in this way. I 
shall argue otherwise, but I should also note that similar challenges over the validity of 
instruments have become routine in applied econometrics, leading to widespread 
skepticism by some, while others press on undaunted in an ever more creative search for 
exogeneity. 
  Yet consideration of the instruments is not without value, especially if we move away 
from instrumental variable estimation, with the use of instruments seen as technical, not 
substantive, and think about the reduced form which contains substantive information 
about the relationship between growth and the instruments. For the case of population 
size, we find that, conditional on the other variables, population size is unrelated to 
growth, which is one of the reasons that the IV estimates of the effects of aid are small or 
zero. This (partial) regression coefficient is a much simpler object than is the instrumental 
variable estimate; under standard assumptions, it tells us how much faster large countries 
grow than small countries, once the standard effects of the augmented Solow model have   20
been taken into account. Does this tell us anything about the effectiveness of aid? Not 
directly, though it is surely useful to know that although large countries receive less per 
capita aid in relation to per capita income, they have grown just as fast as countries that 
have received more, once we take into account the amount that they invest, their levels of 
education, and their starting level of GDP. But we would hardly conclude from this fact 
alone that aid does not increase growth. Perhaps aid works less well in small countries, or 
perhaps there is an offsetting positive effect of population size on economic growth. Both 
are possible, and both are worth further investigation. More generally, such arguments 
are susceptible to fruitful discussions, not only among economists, but also with other 
social scientists and historians who study these questions, something that is typically 
difficult with instrumental variable. Economists’ claims to methodological superiority 
based on instrumental variables ring particularly hollow when it is economists themselves 
who are often misled. My argument is that for both economists and non-economists, the 
direct consideration of the reduced form is likely to generate productive lines of enquiry. 
  The case of the “Egypt” instrument is somewhat different. Once again the reduced 
form is useful (Egypt doesn’t grow particularly fast in spite of all the aid it gets after 
Camp David), though mostly for making it immediately clear that the comparison of 
Egypt versus non-Egypt, or francophone versus non-francophone, is not a useful way of 
assessing the effectiveness of aid on growth. Yet almost every paper in this literature 
unquestioningly uses the Egypt dummy as an instrument. 
  I conclude this section with an example that helps bridge the gap between analyses of 
the macro and analyses of the micro effects of aid. Many microeconomists agree that 
instrumentation in cross-country regressions is unlikely to be useful, while claiming that   21
microeconomic analysis is capable of doing better. We may not be able to answer ill-
posed questions about the macroeconomic effects of foreign assistance, but we can surely 
do better on specific projects and programs. Banerjee and He (2008) have provided a list 
of the sort of studies that they like and that they believe should be replicated more 
widely. One of these, also endorsed by Duflo (2004), is a famous paper by Angrist and 
Lavy (1999) on whether schoolchildren do better in smaller classes, a position frequently 
endorsed by parents and teacher’s unions, but not always supported by empirical work. 
The question is an important one for development assistance, because smaller class sizes 
cost money, and are a potential use for foreign aid. Angrist and Lavy’s paper uses a 
natural experiment, not a real one, and relies on IV estimation, so it provides a bridge 
between the relatively weak natural experiments in this section, and the actual 
randomized controlled trials in the next. 
  Angrist and Lavy’s study is about the allocation of children enrolled in a school into 
classes. Many countries set their class sizes to conform to some version of Maimonides 
Rule, which sets a maximum class size, beyond which additional teachers must be found. 
In Israel, the maximum class size is set at 40. If there are less than 40 children enrolled, 
they will all be in the same class. If there are 41, there will be two classes, one of 20, and 
one of 21. If there are 81 or more children, the first two classes will be full, and more 
must be set up. Angrist and Lavy’s Figure 1 plots actual class size and Maimonides rule 
class size against the number of children enrolled; this graph starts off running along the 
45-degree line, and then falls discontinuously to 20 when enrollment is 40, increasing 
with slope of 0.5 to 80, falling to 27.7 (80 divided by 3) at 80, rising again with a slope of 
0.25, and so on. They show that actual class-sizes, while not exactly conforming to the   22
rule, are strongly influenced by it, and exhibit the same saw-tooth pattern. They then plot 
test scores against enrollment, and show that they display the opposite pattern, rising at 
each of the discontinuities where class-size abruptly falls. This is a natural experiment, 
with Maimonides rule inducing quasi-experimental variation, and generating a predicted 
class size for each level of enrolment which serves as an instrumental variable in a 
regression of test scores on class size. These IV estimates, unlike the OLS estimates, 
show that children in smaller class sizes do better.  
  Angrist and Lavy’s paper, the creativity of its method, and the clarity and 
convincingness of its result has set the standard for micro empirical work since it was 
published, and it has had a far-reaching effect on subsequent empirical work in labor and 
development economics. Yet there is a problem, which has become apparent over time. 
Note first the heterogeneity; it is improbable that the effect of lower class size is the same 
for all children so that, under the assumptions of the LATE theorem, the IV estimate 
recovers a weighted average of the effects for those children who are shifted by 
Maimonides rule from a larger to a smaller class. Those children might not be the same 
as other children, which makes it hard to know how useful the numbers might be in other 
contexts, for example when all children are put in smaller class sizes. The underlying 
reasons for this heterogeneity are not addressed in this quasi-experimental approach. To 
be sure of what is happening here, we need to know more about how different children 
finish up in different classes, which raises the possibility that the variation across the 
discontinuities may not be orthogonal to other factors that affect test scores.  
  A recent paper by Urquiola and Verhoogen (2008) explores how it is that children are 
allocated to different class sizes in a related, but different, situation in Chile where a   23
version of Maimonides rule is in place. Urquiola and Verhoogen note that parents care a 
great deal about whether their children are in the 40 child class or the 20 child class, and 
for the private schools they study, they construct a model in which there is sorting across 
the boundary, so that the children in the smaller classes have richer, more educated 
parents than the children in the larger classes. Their data match such a model, so that at 
least some of the differences in test scores across class size come from differences in the 
children that would be present whatever the class-size. This paper is an elegant example 
of why it is so dangerous to make inferences from natural experiments without 
understanding the mechanisms at work. 
  In preparation for the next section, I note that the problem here is not the fact that we 
have a quasi-experiment rather than a real experiment, so that there was no actual 
randomization. If children had been randomized into class size, the problems would have 
been the same, unless there had been some mechanism for forcing the children (and their 
parents) to accept the assignment. 
 
4. Randomization in the tropics 
Skepticism about econometrics, doubts about the usefulness of structural models in 
economics, and the endless wrangling over identification and instrumental variables, has 
led to a search for alternative ways of learning about development. There has also been 
frustration with the World Bank’s apparent failure to learn from its own projects, and its 
inability to provide a convincing argument that its past activities have enhanced 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Past development practice is seen as a 
succession of fads, with one supposed magic bullet replacing another—from planning to   24
infrastructure to human capital to structural adjustment to health and social capital to the 
environment and back to infrastructure—a process that seems not to be guided by 
progressive learning. For many economists, and particularly for the group at the Poverty 
Action Lab at MIT, the solution has been to move towards randomized controlled trials 
of projects, programs and policies. RCTs are seen as generating gold standard evidence 
that is superior to econometric evidence, and that is immune to the methodological 
criticisms that have been characteristic of econometric analyses. Another aim of the 
program is to persuade the World Bank to replace its current evaluation methods with 
RCTs; Duflo (2004) argues that randomized trials of projects would generate knowledge 
that could be used elsewhere, an international public good. Banerjee (2007, Chapter 1) 
accuses the Bank of “lazy thinking,” of a “resistance to knowledge,” and notes that its 
recommendations for poverty reduction and empowerment show a striking “lack of 
distinction made between strategies founded on the hard evidence provided by 
randomized trials or natural experiments and the rest.” In all this there is a close parallel 
with the evidence-based movement in medicine that preceded it, and the successes of 
RCTs in medicine are frequently cited. Yet the parallels are almost entirely rhetorical, 
and there is little or no reference to the dissenting literature, as surveyed for example in 
Worrall (2007) who documents the rise and fall in medicine of the rhetoric used by 
Banerjee. Nor is there any recognition of the many problems of medical RCTs. 
  The movement in favor of RCTs is currently very successful. The World Bank is now 
conducting substantial numbers of randomized trials, and the methodology is sometimes 
explicitly requested by governments, who supply the World Bank with funds for this 
purpose (see World Bank, 2008 for details of the Spanish Trust Fund for Impact   25
Evaluation). There is a new International Initiative for Impact Evaluation which “seeks to 
improve the lives of poor people in low- and middle-income countries by providing, and 
summarizing, evidence of what works, when, why and for how much,” (International 
Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2008). The Poverty Action Lab lists dozens of 
completed and ongoing projects in a large number of countries, many of which are 
project evaluations. Many development economists would subscribe to the jingoist view 
proclaimed by the editors of the British Medical Journal (quoted by Worrall, 2007) 
which noted that “Britain has given the world Shakespeare, Newtonian physics, the 
theory of evolution, parliamentary democracy—and the randomized trial.”  
 
4.1 The ideal RCT 
Under ideal conditions, and when correctly executed, an RCT can estimate certain 
quantities of interest with minimal assumptions, thus absolving RCTs of one complaint 
against econometric methods, that they rest on often implausible economic models. It is 
useful to lay out briefly the (standard) framework for these results, originally due to Jerzy 
Neyman in the 1920s, currently often referred to as the Holland-Rubin framework or the 
Rubin causal model, see Freedman (2006) for a discussion of the history. According to 
this, each member of the population under study, labeled i, has two possible values 
associated with it,  0i Y  and  1i Y , which are the outcomes that i would display if it did not 
get the treatment,  0, i T =  and if it did get the treatment,  1. i T =  Since each i is either in the 
treatment group or in the control group, we observe one of  0i Y  and  1i Y , but not both. We 
would like to know something about the distribution over i of the effects of the treatment, 
10 , ii YY − in particular its mean  10 . YY −  In a sense, the most surprising thing about this set-  26
up is that we can say anything useful at all, without further assumptions, or without any 
modeling. But that is the magic that is wrought by the randomization.  
 What  we  can observe in the data is the difference between the average outcome in the 
treatments and the average outcome in the controls, or ( | 1) ( | 0) ii ii EY T EY T = −= . This 
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Note that on the right hand side the second term in the first square bracket cancels out 
with the first term in the second square bracket. But the term in the second square bracket 
is zero by randomization; the non-treatment outcomes, like any other characteristic, are 
identical in expectation in the control and treatment groups. We can therefore write (10)  
  10 10 (| 1 ) (| 0 )[ (| 1 ) (| 1 ) ] ii ii ii ii E Y TE Y T E Y TE Y T =− = = =− =  (11) 
so that  the difference in the two observable outcomes is the difference between the 
average treated outcome and the average untreated outcome in the treatment group. The 
last term on the right hand side would be unobservable in the absence of randomization.  
  We are not quite done. What we would like is the average of the difference, rather 
than the difference of averages that is currently on the right-hand side of (11). But the 
expectation is a linear operator, so that the difference of the averages is identical to the 
average of the differences, so that we reach, finally 
  10 1 0 (| 1 ) (| 0 ) ( | 1 ) ii ii i ii E YT E YT E Y YT =− = = − = (12) 
The difference in means between the treatments and controls is an estimate of the average 
treatment effect among the treated which, since the treatment and controls differ only by   27
randomization, is an estimate of the average treatment effect for all. This standard but 
remarkable result depends both on randomization and on the linearity of expectations.  
  One immediate consequence of this derivation is a fact that is often quoted by critics 
of RCTs, but is often ignored by practitioners, at least in economics: RCTs are 
informative about the mean of the treatment effects, 10 ii YY − , but do not identify other 
features of the distribution. For example, the median of the difference is not the 
difference in medians, so an RCT is not, by itself, informative about the median treatment 
effect, something that could be of as much interest to policy makers as the mean 
treatment effect. It might also be useful to know the fraction of the population for which 
the treatment effect is positive, which once again is not identified from a trial. Put 
differently, the trial might reveal an average positive effect although nearly all of the 
population is hurt with a few receiving very large benefits, a situation that cannot be 
revealed by the RCT, although it might be disastrous if implemented. Indeed, Kanbur 
(2002) has argued that much of the disagreement about development policy is driven by 
differences of this kind. Given the minimal assumptions that go into an RCT, it is not 
surprising that it cannot tell us everything that we would like to know. Heckman and 
Smith (1995) discuss these issues at greater length, and also note that, in some 
circumstances, more can be learned. Essentially, the RCT gives us two marginal 
distributions, from which we would like to infer a joint distribution; this is impossible, 
but the marginal distributions limit the joint distribution in a way that can be useful, for 
example if the distribution among the treated stochastically dominates the distribution 
among the controls.   28
  In practice, researchers who conduct randomized controlled trials often do present 
results on statistics other than the mean. For example, the results can be used to run a 
regression of the form 
  01 ii j i j j i j i i
jj
YT X X T u ββ θ φ =+ + + × + ∑ ∑  (13) 
where T is a binary variable that indicates treatment status, and the X’s are various 
characteristics measured at baseline that are included in the regression both on their own 
(main effects) and as interactions with treatment status, see de Mel, McKenzie, and 
Woodruff (2008) for an example of a field experiment with micro-enterprises in Sri 
Lanka. The estimated treatment effect now varies across the population, so that it is 
possible, for example, to estimate whether the average treatment effect is positive or 
negative for various subgroups of interest. These estimates depend on more assumptions 
than the trial itself, in particular on the validity of running a regression like (13), on 
which I shall have more to say below. One immediate charge against such a procedure is 
data mining. A sufficiently determined examination of any trial will eventually reveal 
some subgroup for whom the treatment yielded a significant effect of some sort, and 
there is no general way of adjusting standard errors to protect against the possibility. In 
drug trials, the FDA rules require that analytical plans be submitted prior to trial, and at 
least one economic experiment—moving to opportunity—has imposed similar rules on 
itself, see the protocol by Feins and McInnis (2001). 
  I am not arguing against post-trial subgroup analysis, only that any special epistemic 
status (as in “gold standard,” “hard,” or “rigorous” evidence) possessed by RCTs does 
not extend to subgroup analysis if only because there is no general guarantee that a new 
RCT on post-experimentally defined subgroups will yield the same result. Yet such   29
analyses do not share any special evidential status that might be accorded to RCTs, and 
must be assessed in exactly the same way as we would assess any non-experimental or 
econometric study. These issues are wonderfully exposed by the subgroup analysis of 
drug effectiveness by Horwitz et al (1996), criticized by Altmann (1998), who refers to 
such studies as “a false trail,” Senn and Harrell (1997), “wisdom after the event,” and by 
Davey Smith and Egger (1998), “incommunicable knowledge,” drawing the response 
“reaching the tunnel at the end of the light,” by Horwitz et al (1997). It is clearly absurd 
to discard data because we do not know how to analyze it with sufficient purity. Indeed, 
many important findings have come from post-trial analysis of experimental data, both in 
medicine and in economics, for example of the negative income tax experiments of the 
1960s. None of which resolves the concerns about data-mining. In large-scale, expensive, 
trials, a zero or very small result is unlikely to be welcome, and there is likely to be 
overwhelming pressure to search for some subpopulation that gives a more palatable 
result. 
  The mean treatment effect from an RCT may be of limited value for a physician or a 
policymaker contemplating specific patients or policies. A new drug might do better than 
a placebo in an RCT, yet a physician might be entirely correct in not prescribing it for a 
patient whose characteristics, according to the physician’s theory of the disease, might 
lead her to suppose that the drug would be harmful. Similarly, if we find that dams in 
India do not reduce poverty on average, as in Duflo and Pande’s fine (non-experimental) 
2007 study, there is no implication about any specific dam, even one of the dams 
included in the study, yet it is always a specific dam that a policy maker has to decide 
about. Their evidence certainly puts a higher burden of proof on those proposing a new   30
dam, as would be the case for a physician prescribing in the face of an RCT, though the 
force of the evidence depends on the size of the mean effect and the extent of the 
heterogeneity in the responses. As was the case with the material discussed in Sections 2 
and 3, heterogeneity poses problems for the analysis of RCTs, just as it posed problems 
for non-experimental methods that sought to approximate randomization. For this reason, 
in his Planning of Experiments, Cox (1958, p.15) begins his book with the assumption 
that the treatment effects are identical. He notes that the RCT will still estimate the mean 
treatment effect with heterogeneity, but argues that such estimates are “quite misleading”, 
citing the example of two different subgroups within which the treatment effects are 
identical, so that the RCT delivers an estimate that applies to no one. This 
recommendation makes a good deal of sense when the experiment is being applied to the 
parameter of a well-specified model, but it could not be further away from most current 
practice in either medicine or economics. 
  One of the reasons why subgroup analysis is so hard to resist is that researchers, 
however much they may wish to escape the straitjacket of theory, inevitably have some 
mechanism in mind, and some of those mechanisms can be “tested” on the data from the 
trial. Such “testing,” of course, does not satisfy the strict evidential standards that the 
RCT has been set up to satisfy, and if the investigation is constrained to satisfy those 
standards, no ex post speculation is permitted. Without a prior theory, and within its own 
evidentiary standards, an RCT targeted at “finding out what works,” is not informative 
about mechanisms. For example, when two independent but identical RCTs in two cities 
in India find that children’s scores improved less in Mumbai than in in Vadodora, the 
authors state “this is likely related to the fact that over 80% of the children in Mumbai   31
had already mastered the basic language skills the program was covering,” Duflo, 
Glennerster, and Kremer (2008). It is not clear how “likely” is established here, and there 
is certainly no evidence that conforms to the “gold standard” that is seen as one of the 
central justifications for the RCTs. For the same reason, repeated successful replications 
of a “what works” experiment is both unlikely and unlikely to be persuasive. Learning 
about theory, or mechanisms, requires that the investigation be targeted towards that 
theory, towards why something works, not whether it works. Projects can rarely be 
replicated, though the mechanisms underlying success or failure will often be replicable 
and transportable. This means that if the World Bank had indeed randomized all of its 
past projects, it is unlikely that the cumulated evidence would contain the key to 
economic development.  
  Cartwright (2007a) summarizes the benefits of RCTs relative to other forms of 
evidence. In the ideal case, “if the assumptions of the test are met, a positive result 
implies the appropriate causal conclusion,” that the intervention “worked” and caused a 
positive outcome. She adds “the benefit that the conclusions follow deductively in the 
ideal case comes with great cost: narrowness of scope,” (p. 11). 
 
4.2 Tropical RCTs in practice 
How well do actual RCTs approximate the ideal? Are the assumptions generally met in 
practice? Is the narrowness of scope a price that brings real benefits, or is the superiority 
of RCTs largely rhetorical? As always, there is no substitute for examining each study in 
detail, and there is certainly nothing in the RCT methodology itself that grants immunity   32
from problems of implementation. Yet there are a number of general points that are worth 
discussion. 
  The first is the seemingly obvious practical matter of how to compute the results of a 
trial. In theory this is straightforward, we simply compare the mean outcome in the 
experimental group with the mean outcome in the control group, and the difference is the 
causal effect of the intervention. This simplicity, compared with the often baroque 
complexity of econometric estimators, is seen as one of the great advantages of RCTs, 
both in generating convincing results, and in explaining those results to policy makers 
and the lay public. Yet any difference is not useful without a standard error, and the 
calculation of the standard error is rarely quite so straightforward. As Fisher (1935) 
emphasized from the very beginning, in his famous discussion of the tea lady, 
randomization plays two separate roles. The first is to guarantee that the probability law 
governing the selection of the control group is the same as the probability law governing 
the selection of the experimental group. The second is to provide a probability law that 
enables us to judge whether a difference between the two groups is significant. In his tea 
lady example, Fisher uses combinatoric analysis to calculate the exact probabilities of 
each possible outcome, but in practice this is rarely done. 
  Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008, p.3921) (DGK) explicitly recommend what 
seems to have become the standard method in the development literature, which is to run 
a restricted version of the regression (13), including only the constant and the treatment 
dummy,  
  01 ii i YT u β β = ++  (14)   33
As is easily shown, the OLS estimate of 1 β  is simply the difference between the mean of 
the  i Y  in the experimental and control groups, which is exactly what we want. However, 
the standard error from the OLS regression is not correct unless the variance in the 
experimental group is identical to the variance in the control group, which will only be 
true if the treatment has no effect on the variance, which will not generally be the case 
particularly if treatment responses are heterogeneous. (Indeed, assuming that the 
experiment does not affect the variance is very much against the minimalist spirit of 
RCTs.) If the regression (14) is run with the standard heteroskedasticity correction to the 
standard error, the result will be the same as the formula for the standard error of the 
difference between two means, but not otherwise unless there are equal numbers of 
experimental and controls, in which case the correction makes no difference, and the 
OLS standard error is correct. It is not clear in the experimental development literature 
whether the correction is routinely done in practice, and the handbook review by DGK 
makes no mention of it, although it provides a thoroughly useful review of many other 
aspects of standard errors.  
  Even with the correction for unequal variances, we are not quite done. The general 
problem of testing the significance of the differences between the means of two normal 
populations with different variances is known as the Fisher-Behrens problem. The test 
statistic computed by dividing the difference in means by its estimated standard error 
does not have the t–distribution when the variances are different, and the significance of 
the estimated difference in means is likely to be overstated if no correction is made. If 
there are equal numbers of treatments and controls, the statistic will be approximately 
distributed as Student’s t, but with degrees of freedom that can be as little as half the   34
nominal degrees of freedom when one of the two variances is zero. In general, there is 
also no reason to suppose that the heterogeneity in the treatment effects is normal, which 
will further complicate inference in small samples. 
  Another standard practice, recommended by DGK, and which is also common in 
medical RCTs according to Freedman (2008), is to run the regression (14) with additional 
controls taken from the baseline data, or equivalently (13) with the i X  but without the 
interactions,  
  01 ii j i j i
j
YT X u ββ θ = ++ + ∑  (15) 
The standard argument is that, if the randomization is done correctly, the i X  are 
orthogonal to the treatment variable  i T  so that their inclusion does not affect the estimate 
of 1 β , which is the parameter of interest. However, by absorbing variance, as compared 
with (14), they will increase the precision of the estimate—this is not necessarily the 
case, but will often be true. DGK, p. 3924 give an example “controlling for baseline test 
scores in evaluations of educational interventions greatly improves the precision of the 
estimates, which reduces the cost of these evaluations when a baseline test can be 
conducted.”  
  There are two problems with this procedure. The first, which is noted by DGK, is 
that, as with post-trial subgroup analysis, there is a risk of data mining—trying different 
control variables until the experiment “works”—unless the control variables are specified 
in advance. Again, it is hard to tell whether or how often this dictum is observed. The 
second problem is analyzed by Freedman (2008), who notes that (15) is not a standard 
regression because of the heterogeneity of the responses. Write i α  for the (hypothetical)   35
treatment response of unit i, so that, in line with the discussion in the previous 
subsection, 10 iii YY α =−, and we can write the identity 
  00 0 0 () i i ii ii i YY TY T YY αα =+ = + + − (16) 
which looks like the regression (15) with the X’s and the error term capturing the 
variation in  0. i Y  The only difference is that the coefficient on the treatment term has an i 
suffix because of the heterogeneity. If we define ( | 1) ii ET α α = = , the average treatment 
effect among the treated, as the parameter of interest, as in Section 4.1, we can rewrite 
(16) as  
  00 0 () ( ) ii i i i YY T YY T α αα =+ + − + −  (17) 
Finally, and to illustrate, suppose that we model the variation in  0 i Y  as a linear function of 
an observable scalar 0 i X  and a residual i η , we have  
  0 () [ ( ) ] ii i i i i YT X X T βα θ η αα =+ + −++−  (18) 
with  00 Y β = , which is in the regression form (15), but allows us to see the links with the 
experimental quantities.  
  Equation (18) is analyzed in some detail by Freedman (2008). It is easily shown that 
i T  is orthogonal to the compound error, but that this is not true of  . i X X −  (Nor will it be 
true of the interaction terms in equation 15). However, the two right hand side variables 
are uncorrelated because of the randomization, so the OLS estimate of 1 β  is consistent. 
This is not true ofθ , though this may not be a problem if the aim is to reduce the 
sampling variance. A more serious issue is that the dependency between  i T  and the 
compound error term means that the OLS estimate is biased, and in small samples this   36
bias—which comes from the heterogeneity—may be substantial. Freedman notes that the 
leading term in the bias of the estimate of the OLS estimate ofα  is  /n ϕ  where n is the 













=− − − ∑  (19) 
Equation (19) shows that the bias comes from the heterogeneity, or more specifically, 
from a covariance between the heterogeneity in the treatment effects and the squares of 
the included covariates. With the sample sizes typically encountered in these 
experiments, which are often expensive to conduct, the bias can be substantial. One 
possible strategy here would be to compare the estimates of α  with and without 
covariates; even ignoring pre-test bias, it is not clear how to make such a comparison 
without a good estimate of the standard error. Another possibility is to introduce the 
interactions between the covariates and the treatment, which leads back to (13). An 
incomplete analysis suggests that this might reduce the bias compared with (19). 
  Of these and related issues in medical trials, Freedman writes “Practitioners will 
doubtless be heard to object that they know all this perfectly well. Perhaps, but then why 
do they so often fit models without discussing assumptions?” 
  All of the issues so far can be dealt with, either by appropriately calculating standard 
errors, or by refraining from the use of covariates, though this might involve drawing 
larger and more expensive samples. However, there are other practical problems that are 
harder to fix. One of these is that subjects may fail to accept assignment, so that people 
who are assigned to the experimental group may refuse, and controls may find a way of 
getting the treatment, and either may drop out of the experiment altogether. The classical 
remedy of double blinding, so that neither the subject nor the experimenter know which   37
subject is in which group, is rarely feasible in social experiments—children know their 
class size—and is often not feasible in medical trials—subjects may decipher the 
randomization, for example by asking a laboratory to check that their medicine is not a 
placebo. Heckman (1992) notes that, in contrast to people, “plots of grounds do not 
respond to anticipated treatments of fertilizer, nor can they excuse themselves from being 
treated.” This makes the important point, further developed by Heckman in later work, 
that the deviations from assignment are almost certainly purposeful, at least in part. The 
people who struggle to escape their assignment will do so more vigorously the higher are 
the stakes, so that the deviations from assignment cannot be treated as random 
measurement error, but will compromise the results in fundamental ways. 
  Once again, there is a widely-used technical fix, which is to run regressions like (15) 
or (18), with actual treatment status in place of the assigned treatment status  i T . This 
replacement will destroy the orthogonality between treatment and the error term, so that 
OLS estimation will no longer yield a consistent estimate of the average treatment effect 
among the treated. However, the assigned treatment status, which is known to the 
experimenter, is orthogonal to the error term, and is correlated with the actual treatment 
status, and so can serve as an instrumental variable for the latter. But now we have come 
all the way back to the discussion of instrumental variables in Section 2, and we are 
doing econometrics, not an ideal RCT. Under the assumption of no “defiers”—people 
who do the opposite of their assignment just because of the assignment (and it is not clear 
“just why are there no defiers,” Freedman, 2006)—the instrumental variable converges to 
the local average treatment effect (LATE). As before, it is unclear whether this is what 
we want, and there is no way to find out without modeling the behavior that is   38
responsible for the heterogeneity of the response to assignment, as in the local 
instrumental variable approach developed by Heckman and his coauthors, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (1999, 2007). Alternatively, and as recommended by Freedman (2004, p. 4, 
2006), it is always informative to make a simple unadjusted comparison of the average 
outcomes between treatments and controls according to the original assignment. This 
may also be enough if what we are concerned with is whether the treatment works or not, 
rather than with the size of the effect. In terms of instrumental variables, this is a 
recommendation to look at the reduced form, and again harks back to similar arguments 
in Section 2 on aid effectiveness.  
  There is also a host of operational problems that afflict every actual experiment; these 
can be mitigated by careful planning—in RCTs compared with econometric analysis, 
most of the work is done before data collection, not after—but not always eliminated. In 
this context, I turn to the flagship study of the new movement in development economics, 
Miguel and Kremer’s (2004) study of intestinal worms in Kenya. This paper is repeatedly 
cited in DGK’s manual, and it is one of the exemplary studies cited by Duflo (2004) and 
by Banerjee and He (2008). It was written by two senior authors at leading research 
universities, and published in the most prestigious technical journal in economics. It has 
also received a great deal of positive attention in the popular press, see for example 
Leonhardt (2008), and has been influential in policy, see Poverty Action Lab (2007). In 
this study, a group of “seventy-five rural primary schools were phased into treatment in a 
randomized order,” with the finding “that the program reduced school absenteeism by at 
least one quarter, with particularly large participation gains among the youngest children, 
making deworming a highly effective way to boost school participation among young   39
children” (p. 159). The point of the RCT is less to show that deworming medicines are 
effective, but because children infect one another, that school-based treatment is more 
effective than individual treatment. As befits a paper that aims to change methods as well 
as practice, there is emphasis on the virtues of randomization, and the word “random” or 
its derivatives appears some 60 times in the paper. But the actual method of 
randomization is not precisely described in the paper, and private communication with 
Michael Kremer has confirmed that, in fact, the local partners would not permit the use of 
random numbers for assignment, so that the assignment of schools to three groups was 
done in alphabetical order, as in Albert to group 1, Alfred to group 2, Bob to group 3, 
Charles to group 1 again, David to group 2, and so on. Alphabetization, not 
randomization, was also used in the experiment on flip charts in schools by Glewwe, 
Kremer, Moulin, and Zitzewitz (2004); this paper, like “Worms,” is much cited as 
evidence in favor of the virtues of randomization.  
  Alphabetization may be a reasonable solution when randomization is impossible, but 
we are then in the world of quasi- or natural experiments, not randomized experiments. 
As is true with all forms of quasi-randomization, alphabetization does not guarantee 
orthogonality with potential confounders. Resources are often allocated alphabetically, 
because that is how many lists are presented, and it is easy to imagine that the Kenyan 
government or local NGOs, like Miguel and Kremer, used the alphabetical list to 
prioritize projects or funding. If so, schools higher in the alphabet are systematically 
different, and this difference will be inherited in an attenuated form by the three groups. 
Indeed, this sort of contamination is described by Cox (1958, 74–5) who explicitly warns 
against this sort of convenient design. Of course, it is also possible that the   40
alphabetization causes no confounding with factors known or unknown. If so, there is 
still an issue with the calculation of standard errors. Without a probability law, we have 
no way of discovering whether the difference between treatments and controls could have 
risen by chance. We might think of modeling the situation here by imagining that the 
assignment was equivalent to taking a random starting value and assigning every third 
school to treatment. If so, the fact that there are only three possible assignments of 
schools would have to be taken into account in calculating the standard errors, and 
nothing of this kind is reported. As it is, it is impossible to tell whether the experimental 
differences in these studies are or are not due to chance. 
  In the subsection, I have dwelt on practice not to critique particular studies or 
particular results; indeed it seems entirely plausible that deworming is a good idea, and 
that the costs are low relative to other interventions. My main point here is different, that 
conducting good RCTs is difficult and often expensive, so that problems often arise that 
need to be dealt with by various econometric or statistical fixes. There is nothing wrong 
with such fixes in principle—though they often compromise the substance, as in the 
instrumental variable estimation to correct for failure of assignment—but their 
application takes us out of the world of ideal RCTs, and back into the world of everyday 
econometrics and statistics. So that RCTs, although frequently useful, are not exempt 
from the routine statistical and substantive scrutiny that should be routinely applied to 
any empirical investigation. 
  Although it is well beyond my scope in this paper, I should note that are RCTs in 
medicine—the gold standard to which development RCTs often compare themselves—
are not exempt from practical difficulties, and their primacy is not without challenge. In   41
particular, ethical (human subjects) questions surrounding RCTs in medicine have 
become sufficiently severe to seriously limit what can be undertaken. At the same time 
there is much concern that those who sponsor trials and those who analyze them have 
large financial stakes in the outcome, which sometimes casts doubts on the results. This is 
not currently a problem in economics, but would surely become one if, as the advocates 
argue, RCTs became a precondition for funding of projects. Beyond that Concato et al 
(2000) argue that, in practice, RCTs do not provide useful information beyond what can 
be learned from well-designed and carefully interpreted observational studies. 
  
5. Where should we go from here? 
Cartwright (2007b) maintains a useful distinction between “hunting” causes and “using” 
them, and this Section is about the use of randomized controlled trials for policy. This 
raises the issue of generalizability or external validity—as opposed to internal validity as 
discussed in the previous section—grounds on which development RCTs are sometimes 
criticized, see for example Rodrik (2008). 
  There are certainly cases in both medicine and economics where an RCT has had a 
major effect on the way that people think. In the recent development literature, my 
favorite is Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s (2004) study of women leaders in India. Some 
randomly selected panchayats were forced to have female leaders, and the paper explores 
the differences in outcomes between such villages and others with male leaders. There is 
a theory (of sorts) underlying these experiments; the development community had for a 
while adopted the view that a key issue in development was the empowerment of women 
(or perhaps just giving them “voice”), and if this was done, more children would be   42
educated, more money would be spent on food and on health, and many other socially 
desirable outcomes. Women are altruistic and men are selfish. Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo’s analysis of the Indian government’s experiments shows that this is wrong. There 
are many similar examples in medicine where knowledge of the mean treatment effect 
among the treated, even with some allowance for practical problems, is difficult to 
reconcile with currently held beliefs.  
  Yet I also believe that RCTs of “what works,” even when done without error or 
contamination, are unlikely to be helpful for policy unless they tell us something about 
why it works, something to which they are often neither targeted nor well-suited. Some of 
the issues are familiar and are widely discussed in the literature. Actual policy is always 
likely to be different from the experiment, for example because there are general 
equilibrium effects that operate on a large scale that are absent in a pilot, or because the 
outcomes are different when everyone is covered by the treatment rather than just a 
selected group of experimental subjects. Small development projects that help a few 
villagers or a few villages may not attract the attention of corrupt public officials because 
it is not worth their while to undermine or exploit them, yet they would do so as soon as 
any attempt were made to scale up. The scientists who run the experiments are likely to 
do so more carefully and conscientiously than would the bureaucrats in charge of a full 
scale operation. So that there is no guarantee that the policy tested by the RCT will have 
the same effects as in the trial, even on the subjects included in the trial. 
  It sometimes argued that skepticism about external validity is simply “a version of 
David Hume’s justly famous demonstration of the lack of a rational basis for induction,”   43
Banerjee (2005). But what is going on here is often a good deal more mundane. Worrall 
(2007, p.995) responds to the same argument with the following: 
One example is the drug benoxaprophen (trade name: Opren), a nonsteroidal 
inflammatory treatment for arthritis and musculo-skeletal pain. This passed RCTs 
(explicitly restricted to 18 to 65 year olds) with flying colours. It is however a fact 
that musculo-skeletal pain predominately afflicts the elderly. It turned out, when 
the (on average older) `target population’ were given Opren, there were a 
significant number of deaths from hepato-renal failure and the drug was 
withdrawn.” 
 
In the same way, an educational protocol that was successful when randomized across 
villages in India holds many things constant that would not be constant if the program 
were transported to Guatemala or Vietnam. These examples demonstrate a failure to 
control for relevant factors, not the impossibility of induction. 
  Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue that it is the combination of mechanism and context 
that generates outcomes and that without understanding that combination, scientific 
progress is not possible. Nor can we safely go from experiments to policy. In economics, 
the language would be about theory, building models, and tailoring them to local 
conditions. Policy requires a causal model; without it, we cannot understand the welfare 
consequences of a policy, even a policy where causality is established and that is proven 
to work on its own terms. Banerjee (2007) describes an RCT by Duflo, Hanna and Ryan 
(2008) as “a new economics being born.” This experiment used cameras to monitor and 
prevent teacher absenteeism in villages in the Indian state of Rajasthan. Curiously, 
Pawson and Tilley (1997, pp 78–82) use the example of cameras (to deter crime in car 
parks) as one of their running examples. They note that cameras do not, in and of 
themselves, prevent crime because they do not make it impossible to break into a car. 
Instead, they depend on triggering a series of behavioral changes. Some of those changes   44
show positive experimental outcomes—crime is down in the car parks with cameras—but 
are undesirable, for example because crime is shifted to other car parks, or because the 
cameras change the mix of patrons of the car park. There are also cases where the 
experiment fails but has beneficial effects. It would not be difficult to construct similar 
arguments for the cameras in the Indian schools, and welfare conclusions cannot be 
supported unless we understand the behavior of teachers, pupils, and their parents. Duflo, 
Hanna, and Ryan (2008) understand this, and use their experimental results to construct a 
model of teacher behavior; other papers that use structural models to interpret 
experimental results include Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attanasio, Meghir and 
Santiago (2005). 
  Cartwright (2007a) draws a contrast between the rigor applied to establish internal 
validity—to establish the gold standard status of RCTs—and the much looser arguments 
that are used to defend the transplantation of the experimental results to policy. For 
example, running RCTs to find out whether a project works is often defended on the 
grounds that the experimental project is like the policy that it might support. But the 
“like” is typically argued by an appeal to similar circumstances, or a similar environment, 
arguments that can only be mounted for observable variables. Yet controlling for 
observables is the key to the matching estimators that are the main competitors for RCTs, 
and that are typically rejected by their advocates on the grounds that RCTs control, not 
only for things that we observe, but things that we cannot. As Cartwright notes, the 
validity of  evidence-based policy depends on the weakest link in the chain of argument 
and evidence, so that by the time we seek to use the experimental results, the advantage 
of RCTs over matching or other econometric methods has evaporated. In the end, there is   45
no substitute for careful evaluation of the chain of evidence and reasoning by people who 
have the experience and expertise in the field. The demand that experiments be theory-
driven is, of course, no guarantee of success, though the lack of it is close to a guarantee 
of failure.  
  It is certainly not always obvious how to combine theory with experiments. Indeed, 
much of the interest in RCTs—and in instrumental variables and other econometric 
techniques that mimic random allocation—comes from a deep skepticism about much 
economic theory, and impatience with its ability to deliver structures that seem at all 
helpful in interpreting reality. The wholesale abandonment in American graduate schools 
of price theory in favor of infinite horizon intertemporal optimization and game theory 
has not been a favorable development for young empiricists. Empiricists and theorists 
seem further apart now than at any period in the last quarter century. Yet reintegration is 
hardly an option because without it there is no chance of long term scientific progress. 
One promising area is the recent work in behavioral economics, and the closer integration 
of economics and psychology, whose own experimental tradition is clearly focused on 
behavioral regularities. The experiments reviewed in Levitt and List (2008), often 
involving both economists and psychologists, cover such issues as loss aversion, 
procrastination, hyperbolic discounting, or the availability heuristic, all of which are 
examples of behavioral mechanisms that promise applicability beyond the specific 
experiments. There also appears to be a good deal of convergence between this line of 
work, inspired by earlier experimental traditions in economic theory and in psychology, 
and the most recent work in development. Instead of using experiments to evaluate 
projects, looking for which projects work, this development work designs its experiments   46
to test predictions of theories that are generalizable to other situations. Without any 
attempt to be comprehensive, some examples are Karlan and Zinman (2008), who are 
concerned with the price-elasticity of the demand for credit, Bertrand et al (2008), who 
take predictions about the importance of context from the psychology laboratory to the 
study of advertising for small loans in South Africa, Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2009) 
who construct and test a behavioral model of procrastination for the use of fertilizers by 
small farmers in Kenya, and Giné and Karlan (2008), who use an experiment in the 
Philippines to test the efficacy of a smoking-cessation product designed around 
behavioral theory. In all of this work, the project, when it exists at all, is the embodiment 
of the theory that is being tested and refined, not the object of evaluation in its own right, 
and the field experiments are a bridge between the laboratory and the analysis of 
“natural” data, List (2006). The collection of purpose-designed data and the use of 
randomization often make it easier to design the sort of acid test that can be more difficult 
to construct without them. If we are lucky, this work will provide the sort of behavioral 
realism that has been lacking in much of economic theory while, at the same time, 
identifying and allowing us to retain the substantial parts of existing economic theory that 
remain genuinely useful.  
  In this context, it is worth looking back to the previous phase of experimentation in 
economics that started with the New Jersey income tax experiments. A rationale for these 
experiments is laid out in Orcutt and Orcutt (1968), in which the vision is a formal model 
of labor supply with the experiments used to estimate its parameters. By the early 1990s, 
however, experimentation had moved on to a “what works” basis, and Manski and 
Garfinkel (1992), surveying the experience, write “there is, at present, no basis for the   47
popular belief that extrapolation from social experiments is less problematic than 
extrapolation from observational data. As we see it, the recent embrace of reduced-form 
social experimentation to the exclusion of structural evaluation based on observational 
data is not warranted.” Their statement still holds good, and it would be worth our while 
trying to return to something like Orcutt and Orcutt’s vision. 
  Finally, I want to return to the issue of “heterogeneity,” a running theme in this 
lecture. Heterogeneity of responses first appeared in Section 2 as a technical problem for 
instrumental variable estimation, dealt with in the literature by local average treatment 
estimators. Randomized controlled trials provide a method for estimating quantities of 
interest in the presence of heterogeneity, and can therefore be seen as another technical 
solution for the “heterogeneity problem.” They allow estimation of mean responses under 
extraordinarily weak conditions. But as soon as we deviate from ideal conditions, and try 
to correct the randomization for inevitable practical difficulties, heterogeneity again rears 
its head, biasing estimates, and making it difficult to interpret what we get. In the end, the 
technical fixes fail and compromise our attempts to learn from the data. What this should 
tell us is that the heterogeneity is not a technical problem, but a symptom of something 
deeper, which is the failure to specify causal models of the processes we are examining. 
This is the methodological message of this lecture, that technique is never a substitute for 
the business of doing economics. 
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